Meaning in Life Does Not Exist and Would Not Focus on Rationality If It Did
Meaning in Life Does Not Exist and Would Not Focus on Rationality If It Did
Stephen Kershnar
ABSTRACT
Thad Metz offers some insightful responses to my criticisms of his important book, Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), on meaning in life. Here I argue that his responses do not succeed. Earlier I provided two objections to Metz’s theory. First, meaning in life is not a type of value distinct from the standard types of value, specifically, what is good in itself (intrinsic good), good for someone (prudential good), or good for someone independent of pleasure and desire-fulfillment (objective-list good). Second, if there is meaning in life, then Metz’s theory does not capture it because it is an overly intellectual account.
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